ries. And such theories have in turn become powerful elements of popular culture as well as of sociological images of society and historical interpretations of culture.
Considering that scientists and technologists at times misuse their public credit as creators of complex machineries by venturing farreaching interpretations of societal processes, I find it appropriate to preface my subject proper-sociologists' images of technology, in particular "the com puter"-with a few rem arks on com puter scien tists' images o f their proper subject.
Metaphors of Technology in Computer Science
Ever since the invention of artificial intelligence (AI), controversies in com puter science about the "nature" of AI machines have persis tently hinged on the implicit or explicit question of their likeness to hum an beings (likeness, sometimes softened into similarity, resem blance, or mere analogy).7 Interestingly, com puter scientists, as much as social scientists, philosophers, and popular writers, interpret this question as being almost equivalent to the question of people's likeness to com puters.8 Earl MacCormac's "Computational M etaphor" points both ways, Pamela McCorduck's Machines Who Think find their correspondents in "people that think."9 Having previously studied the cultural influence of Freudian interpretations of hum an actions, Sherry Turkle notes: "If behind popular fascination with Freudian theory there was a nervous, often guilty preoccupation with the self as sexual, behind increasing interest in computational interpretations of mind is an equally nervous preoccupation with the idea of self as a machine. This question of hum ans' likeness to machines (computers) in turn appears in three highly intertwined variants: as an epistemic problem of the explicability of hum an behavior (action?) in terms of natural (engineering?) science; as a historical problem of a progressive "machinization" of hum an agency; and as an ethical problem regarding the determ ination of hum an acts and free will. Turkle poses the question mainly in this last sense, but her central notion applies to all three versions: "At different points in history this same debate has played on different stages. Traditionally a theological issue, in the first quarter of this century it was played out in debate about psychoanalysis. In the last quarter of this century it looks as though it is going to be played out in debate about machines."1 1 T he opposite theme, of the com puter's likeness to hum an beings, is, of course, an old one. But while discussions in the early times of AI machines centered on the imitability of very specific cognitive skills ("to win a chess endgam e"), they seem since to have entered a new phase. Younger com puter scientists talk more literally about, and believe in, the possibility of creating surrogate brains that m erit the attribute "creature" or "living." In his book The Tomorrow Makers, Grant Fjerntedal quotes the Carnegie-Mellon robotics specialist Hans Moravec: "We are on a threshold of a change in the universe comparable to the transition from nonlife to life." And he also quotes a research assistant as saying: "Moravec wants to design a creature, and my professor Newell wants to design a creature. We are all, in a sense, trying to play God."12 For the first time, the question of the "livingness" or "creatureliness" of machines is not only being critically discussed by scientists but asserted. Projected AI machineries are placed in an evolutionary context without ado. This is amplified in popular work on computers. Geoff Simons, for instance, writing from the National Com puter Centre in England, takes a highly benign view: " [T] here is overwhelming evidence that we are now witnessing the birth of . . . the indefinitely superior creatures that machina sapiens will become!"13
Metaphors of Technology in Social Science
So far, sociology has not had much to say on technology per se. As W erner Rammert has shown in some detail, "distance to artefacts" is still characteristic of most sociological studies of technology.1 '1 This is about to change, however, in a lively social-constructivist research scene that has come much closer.15 Interestingly, a growing concern in the sociology of science and technology for freestanding artifacts tends to center on computers, too. But the concentration on com put ers, and the approaches taken, can hardly be understood without a review of the way technology has been treated in received social science. Before taking a closer look at more recent sociological conceptualizations, one may cast a short glance, therefore, at the way ordinary social experience with technology and its m etaphors has perm eated social-science intercourse with technology in the past.
People have always breathed "life" into their creations-think of the powerful myth of Pygmalion. Conversely, they have always been afraid that their products may win power over them, that the relationship between hum ans and machines may in some deadly way be inverted-think of the Golem theme, or Frankenstein and his monster. In the interaction between man and oeuvre, between crea ture and created, the topos of life and death plays a very im portant role.
Not surprisingly, the life-death m etaphor has been at the root of social-science interaction with industrial technology, too, and the history of this interpretative frame deserves a separate analysis. A few observations may suffice here, starting with the central Marxian image of living work as a generic term for all hum an activity and dead work for machine activity. T he m etaphor is echoed in Max Weber's formulation: "A lifeless machine is reified mind. It is only this that gives it the power to force hum ans into its service and to dom inate their daily working life to the extent to which this is effectively the case in the factory. Reified mind is also that living machine represented by bureaucratic organization.",b Bureaucracy is portrayed here as living, perhaps because it was less obviously machine-operated in Weber's lime. But is administration via the written word not bureaucratic rule mediated by a particular inform ation and communication technol- ogy? Note, also, the intellectual influence of Ju rg en Habermas's categories o f system versus life world; again the image of life and death is powerfully at work-and "bureaucracy" no longer stands for "living."
A related m etaphor that regains acuity in contem porary interpre tations of microelectronic inform ation processing was the opposition of mind and soul (e.g., Ludwig Klages). Here, soul represented the vital source of hum an activity; mind, the cerebral alienation from this source. T he mind becomes the enemy of all that has life-its product, technology, the medium of a deadly counterprinciple. T he soul-mind juxtaposition seems to relate back to what (in the classical worldview) was the more fundam ental one of life-death through the metaphorics of hand and head: m anual work as living productive work; nonm an ual work as exploitative work and work intended to replace living by dead work-the generating of technology.
T he list of such mutually related root m etaphors can easily be extended: woman (life, soul)-man (death, mind); east-west; day (sun)-night (moon); above-below; yin and yang. More or less clandes tinely, they all inspire recurring attempts to achieve a reculturization of science in the face of a "crisis of the sciences" and apparently overpowering technology. It seems, then, that the social sciences have persistently dealt with m odern technology, and continue to do so, in the light of manifold m etaphors through which reality is interpreted as a series of juxtapositions of fundam ental forces and principles. Technology almost always emerges as peculiarly ambiguous, involved in a tangled way in both domains, even though, all things said, predom inantly as an element of secularization and disenchantment.
This interpretative tradition is continued in contem porary socialscience argum ents critical of computers. Com puting machinery is often seen as a new type of technology, wholly different in quality from traditional industrial technology. At the same time, it is made into an incomparably more powerful vehicle of a countervailing unnatural and life-threatening principle: com puter technology as the medium of an even more far-reaching machinization, digitalization, algorithmization, moral-affective devastation, and expropriation of hum an capabilities.
Unlike the com puter sciences, though, the social sciences' preoccu pation with technology has remained on highly interpretative, meta phoric levels. Except for ergonomics, it has contributed little to the actual shaping of machinery. And only a few scholars have focused their conceptual work on the constitution of things and, more specifically, of technical artifacts. Those who have done so have had no great effect on social-science theorizing.
Where this road has been taken, however, interesting parallels appear. Jean Piaget, for instance, devoted much of his work to studying the development of action coordinations relating to the physical, outside world and the constitution of things in action. He identified consecutive extended accommodative (objectifying) and as similative (subjectifying) processes in the construction (as we would say today) of both the actor and that which is acted upon. From the way children build up their external world, he later derived essential argum ents that led to a theory of epistemic structures such as logic and mathematics in his genetic epistemology.17 Ernst E. Boesch, a cultural psychologist, generalizes such considerations to cultural evolution at large, studying the transform ations o f animistic forms of thing constitution into more rationalized form s.18 Again, spirals, as it were, of objectifications and subjectifications, under the primacy of the latter, are postulated.
Simplifying and generalizing greatly, I suggest that evidence drawn from animists, children, and natural scientists19 (a fourth group would, of course, be psychotics)20 has led to peculiarly similar expla nations. Social scientists approaching the constitution of (materialtechnical) artifacts in an empirical-analytical m anner have pointed out progressions of attribution and denial of sentience, of animation and neutralization of technical objects, reflecting a continuous dialectic of cultural, personal, and scientific cognitive-emotional processes. In vesting technology with hum an or superhum an qualities, be they demonic or eudemonic, can be understood as strategies for "reassim ilating" (Piaget) problematic rationalizations and resulting disenchantments.
In sum, then, a root m etaphor o f life and death in the social sciences (where technology stands for death) peculiarly contrasts with an evolutionary root m etaphor (where technology becomes an em er gent life-form) in com puter sciences. Sociologists turning to an empirical study of com puter phenom ena encounter deep-seated interpretative differences in the two scientific cultures. Not only are '(Jean Piaget, Introduction a I'epistemologie genetique (Paris, 1950 these differences difficult to reconcile, there are hardly any elabo rated research traditions for empirically analyzing the social constitu tion of things. As the social sciences have unfolded into disciplines, technology as an elem ent of material culture has almost vanished from sociological conceptualizations. But the excommunication of tangible artifacts and their aggregates from sociological theory and their categorization as subject m atter of "the other culture" (the natural and engineering sciences) become untenable, so it would seem, in the face of the computer.
Computer Metaphors
While sociologists have long taken little notice analytically of technical artifacts-the hard core of technological systems-some new sociologists of technology begin to accord to complex materialtechnical artifacts a systematic conceptual status. Com puting machin ery plays a prom inent role here, often justified (while being a m atter of funding, too) by the unique character of these machines. This reflects lively extrascientific debates in which radical departures from traditional industrial social forms have widely come to be symbolized by "the com puter."
Hence, though machines in general are discussed in the following, the focus is on advanced artifacts capable of the program m ed processing of surprisingly large amounts of electrical "signals" at surprising speed-said by their designers to be endowed with artificial intelligence. Note that the programs of such machines, so-called software, are not treated here as somehow "immaterial" but rather as integral parts of the material artifact.21 T he categorical distinction that social scientists commonly make between "material hardw are" and "immaterial software" seems quite unw arranted. In engineering terms, the line between hard and soft is an entirely pragmatic matter. T he difference between the two comes down to the different technical parlances that engineers, com puter scientists, and technicians use for "their" machine components. Any specialist language has its own rhetoric. For obvious reasons the m etaphors of software talk are more hum an than those for hardw are talk, and software talk lends itself more easily to "ideologization" and mythologizing association with superm etaphors. Sherry Turkle's description of com puter languages provides a good example. LISP, for instance, has often been presented as the language of liberalization, as opposed to bureaucratic slave languages: "To the eyes of the hacker, business languages, for example the IBM lan guages FORTRAN and COBOL, and the 'scientific' language PAS CAL, have come to represent the uniformity of mass culture that buries the individual in the crowd. In 'Software Wars' [a popular hacker dram a modeled on Star Wars films] these appear as the languages appropriate to the totalitarian rule of 'the Em pire.' LISP is the language of pleasure, of individuality, a language that facilitates a way o f thinking where . . . 'it is easy to live in the world of Godel, Escher, Bach.' "22 Similarly, personal com puter (PC) connoisseurs propagate different images for different com puter makes. IBM PCs are hierarchical command machines, "the Pentagon in a shoebox"; Apple Ils are alternative machines, useful and designed for cooper ative and creative activities outside bureaucratic and corporate con texts.
Such images are far removed from the reality of electronic combi nation devices; they belong to the category of ideology. This is not to say that their study is irrelevant to the present discussion. On the contrary, it means only that adopting such software ideologies for the construction of social-science concepts of Al technology predeter mines images of technology that are, as I will try to show, analytically problematic and practically misleading.23
Computer as Butterfly and, Bat
The image of butterfly and bat came to me while reading The Second Self, hitherto the most ambitious empirical (ethnographic) study of the cultural implications of com puter technology. In an earlier essay, "Com puter as Rorschach," Turkle had already form ulated her central thesis: Computers are projective objects, akin to Rorschach tests, those inkblots designed by a Swiss psychiatrist in order to reconstruct, on the basis of their interpretations, the inner world of respondents.24 "Turkic (n. 8 above), pp. 225-26. 'A reverse misapprehension of the nature of electronic machinery can be found in social studies that remain fixated on hardware (installed components like transistors, integrated circuits, and microprocessors) and therefore on inventions and innovations at the level o f inalei ials and production technologies, related corporate strategies, state anti user interests, and the like. See, e. 
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B iillc i dies and hats are common interpretations in the Rorschach lests, and I use them, in turn, for interpreting sociological images of let hnology. Like any proper metaphor, this one is m eant to evoke several interpretations. In the first place, it stands for the "projectivity" of machine technology, quite in tune with Turkle's initial notion that technologies are manifestations of cultural projects. Beyond this, I use it to indicate the "dual face," the ambiguity of technology as a pervasive m otif o f social-science interpretations o f technology. Last, however, bat and butterfly stand for the "fluttering" approach some sociologists take-now coquettish and seductive, now frightening and aversive-in dealing with the new machines.
In this last sense, my main argum ent concerns the way that m etaphors of the field, supercharged with meaning, are put to conceptual uses, as a theoretical resource for a sociological study of technology.25
New Sociologists of Technology
In his famous paper, "Com puting Machinery and Intelligence," Alan Turing-not a sociologist by far--has answered the eminently social question "Can machines think?" with a behavioristically qual ified "Yes!" And yet at least two argum ents in his text do not accord with behaviorist creed. It is, says Turing, common, in order to avoid endless discussions about who can think, "to have the polite conven tion that everyone does."26 And even before that he ventures a prediction of far-reaching importance for the problem at hand: "At the end of the century the use o f words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak o f machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted."27 H idden in Turing's classically cool text is then a "subtext" that points to the social construction of reality (including machinery) via the use of language "This is certainly not to doubt the importance of metaphoric understanding. On the contrary, Jerome Bruner's advice not to underestimate the power of "just metaphoric" knowledge in creative thinking applies even more to scientific creativity. Even so, 1 would prefer to continue entertaining the thought that creative scientists, especially in the analysis of scientific-technological developments, should (try to) aim at what Bruner calls producing "effective surprise" through empirical clarification rather than through metaphorical invention. Jerome S. Bruner, "The Conditions of Creativity," in H. E. Gruber, G. and common talk.28 Machines will think when people believe they think. I assume, for the purpose of furth er discussion, that the beliefs of sociologists are not entirely negligible in this matter.
Confronted with computers, some sociologists have decided to ignore machines no longer. Some apparatus can evidently perform operations that traditionally were thought to m erit the hum an at tribute "mental." One finds that old questions about the life and death of things are no longer asked only by children and prem oderns but also by an elite of scientists. In view o f the transferability of mental processes to new machines, those who construct and explain them prominently enter debates about the nature and meaning of hum an life. Should this not concern sociology? In what sense? Surely in some way related to social action. I will try to trace this newly awakened interest by referring to four sociologists who have recently advanced conceptualizations of machinery that go beyond traditional ap proaches: Sherry Turkle, Michel Calion, Steve Woolgar, and Randall Collins.29
Sherry Turkle, of the Massachusetts Institute o f Technology (in Daniel D ennett's words, the "Vatican City of High Church Computationalism" in AI research), proceeds from a strict analogy between the cultural power of Freudian psychoanalytic constructs and the cultural influence of computers. Both are seen as "evocative objects" that "catalyze" dramatic changes in our thoughts, emotions, and actions.
Turkle unravels the way in which the two antipodal groups of chil dren (including girls) and AI theoreticians (all males) confront com puters. She shows that dealing with these machines actualizes funda mental philosophical issues: W hat is it to be human? For example, computers seem to force members of both groups to revise their culturally or philosophically taken-for-granted ontologies: hierarchies like "stones-plants-animals-humans," built on schemes like "nonliving-living-sentient-rational," become tangled. How can new order be achieved where apparently nonliving objects obviously do perform rationally? Should hum ans and machines move closer to each other as opposed to less noble creatures? But no, are hum ans not part of all living creation, high or low, essentially superior to anything artificial, including seemingly noble-because mentally endowed-AI machines? What are the grounds on which to build a new, consistent hierarchy? Turkle fascinatingly introduces us to the epistemic struggles
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How does she herself conceptualize this material? In the first place, she has a thesis that computers are machines of an extraordinary, unique kind because, unlike other technologies, they leave endless room for their users' desires, projections, and intentions. But it seems to me that she also allows respondents to seduce her into conceptu alizing "the computer," just as they do, as a challenging and dem and ing counteractor of humans. "We cede to the com puter the power of reason, but at the same time, in defense, our sense of identity becomes increasingly focused on the soul and the spirit in the hum an machine."30
In a twofold way, Turkle's interpretation of computers is well reflected in the image of the butterfly. On the one hand, she is largely optimistic about the cultural and social changes opening up with the appearance of this technology:
As I have worked on this book I have often been asked, "Are computers good or bad?" . . . No one asks whether relationships with people are good or bad in general. Rather we seek out the inform ation to build our own model of a particular relationship. Only then do we make judgments about I lie possible effects of the relationship. We have long experience with ibis kind of model building of relationships between people, but we are only begin ning to think in this more textured way about our relationships with technology. Com puters tire not good or bad; I hey tire powerful. It is a commonplace to say that they tire powerful in their instru mental use. I he modes of relating to computers and the opposi tions I list1 . . . are a contribution to understanding the computer's subjective power in a more nuanced way." Note in this passage the analogy (homology?) between relationships to computers and to people. W hat is more, computers are seen as potentially friendly partners. Turkle differs here from social scientists who have drawn rather dark and at times pandemonic pictures. Not really a bat, the computer, in Turkle's version.
On the other hand, Turkle's analyses rem ain somewhat lofty, swaying as it were between projections offered "out there" and conventional conceptual repertoires. Also, at no point does she deal with other "evocative" artifacts, and she seems to ignore that new mechanisms, transported from one cultural context to another, have always raised existential issues. Do we not know, from social anthropology or research in develop ing countries, that technologies transferred from one culture to a very different one cease for some time to be technologies in a specifiable sense? T heir status as systems o f action becomes uncertain. They are experienced simultaneously as entirely useless or pleasurable in themselves and as frightening machinations without any familiar value reference or as universal vehicles for fulfilling hitherto unsat isfied needs, or again as an ultimate loss of unrenounceable values.
This cultural figuration can be traced generally, from the medical syringe in the Congo to nuclear energy, or, today possibly only in its beginnings, to AI machines. Pure Funktionslust and naked, unreason able fear, wild hopes for a better life and apocalyptic prem onitions about the end of hum an civilization lie close together. If something like "pure value realization" (all bat or butterfly) and "pure technol ogy" (neutral instrumentality) exists at all, then it exists in these moments when technical potential moves from one limiting cultural context to another.
Could it be that Turkle's version of the com puter springs, at one level, from such transcultural situations? Be that as it may, her analyses tend to elevate the alluring, captivating, and bewitching experiences with AI machines in society to the status of a crucial theoretical construct: "U nder pressure from the computer, the ques tion of mind in relation to machine is becoming a central cullutal preoccupation. It is becoming for us what sex was to the Victorians threat and obsession, taboo and fascination."32
Michel Calion works at another high place of technology discourse, the Ecole Nationale Superieure des Mines in Paris. In his study Society in the Making, he declares engineers to be the heller sociologists. Drawing on Tourainian action sociology and British social construc tionism, he proposes to reconstruct and appropriate their concepts lor an analysis of the constitution of technical artifacts. In order to do this he introduces the concept of an "actor-world" and postulates that "[W]e must begin with a world that includes nature, society, and the obsessions and interests of men (instead of evoking a natural world distinct from society). Also we must establish a general map of resistances that are met and used by the actors, whoever these actors may be (instead of establishing a map limited to social interests).'™ Calion leaves no doubt that he wants to count "natural entities" among such actors. "One must abandon the easier, conventional analysis that tends to constrain [these] relationships within a tight corset of sociological categories."" Taking his empirical material from a case study of the aborted project to develop an advanced electric vehicle for Electricite de France (EDF), in a race with Renault's plans to develop "Le Car," Calion does not discuss AI in this study. But his plea for borrowing participant actors'-particularly engineers'-concepts is unusually explicit. 35 Having described the social background of the controversial R&D project in conventional fashion, Calion proceeds:
Up to this point, the entities reviewed are familiar to the sociologist. One finds consumers, social movements, and minis terial services. But it would be an error to dose the inventory. T here are also accumulators, fuel cells, electrodes, electrons, catalysts, and electrolytes. For, if the electrons do not play their part or the catalysts become contam inated, the result would not be any less disastrous than if the users find the new vehicle repulsive, the new regulations are not administered, or Renault stubbornly decides to develop "le Car." In the world defined and constructed by EDF, at least three new entities that play an essential role must be added: the zn/air accumulators, the lead accumulators, and the fuel cells with their cohort of associated elements (catalysts, electrons, etc.).36
An im portant concept in this view is that of conflict, and in the event of success, a mutual balance of power between "the elements of the actor-world." Calion asks, for instance, w hether the potential buyers of a technology are easier to influence "than the electrons moving between the two electrodes of the cell, or the world m arket of platinum ."37 I will not discuss further the conceptual difficulties this raises. The critical point seems to be that Calion seriously proposes to conceptu alize, next to "social," "natural actors," and to replace voluntaristic concepts such as "interests," which could not easily be generalized to natural actors, with "resistance." T he switching of terms, for both kinds of actors, is made peculiarly suggestive by placing it in the context of T ouraine's political sociology and its imagery. (John Law undertakes to further ground Calion's approach within a "non-reductionist sociology." His technical star is a sailing ship, the Portu guese caravel, which, in battle against mighty natural actors such as Cape Bojador on the African Atlantic, helped to carry forward Portuguese maritime expansion.)38
Are natural actors good or bad, heroes or scoundrels, butterflies or bats? With Calion this seems to depend largely on who manages to overcome their resistance and win their cooperation. In the electric vehicle he doubtless sees a pretty butterfly (even if it did not unfold). Just as clearly, Le Car is an ugly bat. As with sociology in general, this author's preferences are not entirely irrelevant to his analysis.
Steve Woolgar, at Brunel University, belongs to the group of pre dominantly British sociologists of science who have m ounted, over the past ten or fifteen years, the most forceful attack against traditional theories of science. From positions variously labeled ethnom ethodological, phenomenological, social-constructivist, interpretative, or discourse analytical, the ideological nature o f orthodox m ethodolo gies of science was revealed by providing evidence for the view that observations, conjectures, and refutations in scientific research are as culture dependent, interest driven, situated, and highly negotiable as elsewhere in social life. In Laboratory Life, a study on neuroendocri nological research, Woolgar and Bruno Latour had already suggested that there exists "an essential similarity between the inscription capabilities of apparatus, the manic passion for marking, coding, and filing, and the literary skills of writing, persuasion, and discussion." Science, too, is a form of literary inscription.39
T he attribution of inscription capabilities to scientific apparatus seems to foreshadow Woolgar's explicit program , in his paper "Why Not a Sociology of Machines?" for treating computers as subjects. 40 The argum ent is modeled on neo-Wittgensteinian, post-Kuhnian "shifts in epistemological preconceptions" concerning the nature of scientific knowledge and practice. Just as the new sociology of science must transcend the distinction between cognitive and social in order lo reveal these and similar dichotomies as scientists' stratagems to perpetuate a privileged image of their enterprise, so must a sociology of AI not "adopt the distinctions, concepts and assumptions of AI discourse."" In Woolgar's view, the basic feature o f AI discourse is the distinction between man and machine in terms of intelligence and nonintelligence, justified in turn by a "distinction between the m eta physical and the epistemological." Taking his examples from the development of expert systems, he interprets the AI discourse42 as entrepreneurial:
By virtue of their "political" skills . . . certain individuals have become highly effective salespersons. In particular, they have mobilized the distinction between man and machine in claiming their own particular (human) expertise to speak about expert systems (machines). They thus define the nature and character of the object of study, they establish that these are indeed the proper objects of investigation and they claim to be uniquely competent in speaking on behalf of these objects. T he rest of us are obliged to defer to what these privileged spokesmen have to say about expert systems . . . they establish themselves as experts on the social order of expert systems. . . .
[O]ur uncritical adoption of the man-machine distinction would am ount to compliance with the argum ents of the entrepreneurs.4' Woolgar proceeds by distinguishing options for a sociology for and of AI, depending on "our preconceptions about the nature of machines and hum an behaviour and . . . on w hether we construe of machines as subjects or objects of sociological analysis." He finds a "sociology of the AI community" wanting because not much could be learned about AI researchers' products. And he continues:
[W]e can adopt the more current sociology of science position that the products of AI research are socially constructed. U nder this rubric one would develop a sociology of the characterization, design and use of intelligent machines; the machines would be portrayed as socially constituted objects. Note, however, that this approach grants priority to humans as constructing agents, and this implicitly adopts the key distinction between humans and machines which pervades AI discourse. . . . [Another] sociology of AI would construe intelligent machines as the subjects of study. T here seem no difficulties of principle in using standard sociological methods in this approach. . . . [T]his project will only strike us as bizarre to the extent that we are unwilling to grant hum an intelligence to intelligent machines.44
In a way, this seems to be what Woolgar proposes, shedding questions like "Are artificially intelligent machines sufficiently like humans to be treated as the subjects of sociological inquiry? Or, to reverse the more usual query, in what sense can we continue to presum e that hum an intelligence is not artificial?" But he goes one step further and argues that both approaches still "involve the implicit adoption of the hum an-m achine distinction": "[W]e need to eschew approaches which are unnecessarily parasitic of participants' dichot omies, and develop a sociological approach which takes as its focus the human/mechanical language community; the community composed of 'expert machines and machine experts.' "* On the other hand, however, Woolgar stops short of assigning sociologists a practical role in the construction of AI machines, doubting the willingness of "neo-W ittgensteinians" to allow their argum ents to be codified and program m ed in the computationalistcognitivist languages o f AI™ In this sense, he does not keep up with the radical thrust o f some sociologists of science who would see sociologists in a role similar to that of engineers struggling with natural actors.
One im portant aspect of this program would be to substantiate Woolgar's claim that AI practitioners do not in fact "talk IN TEL LI GENCE," that is, do not doubt that machines can think and talk, just as researchers do not, if one trusts laboratory research, "talk SCI ENCE" or truth. A nother aspect would be to find out just how the public spokespersons of AI "respond to the argum ent that the achievements of AI should not be evaluated in terms of their relevance for 'intelligence' or any other 'm ental' phenom ena." C orre spondingly, Woolgar concludes, we should take AI machines as an occasion for "reassessing the central axiom of sociology that there is something distinctly ' social' about human behaviour."*1
It would be too easy to counter this sophisticated scheme by saying that it might be too rash to strip hum an activity of the sole right to the epithet "social" in order to be able to ascribe the status of subjects to intelligent machines. Woolgar's central interest here-to open up nonhum an phenomena, insulated by their proponents, to sociological inquiry-is far too important, as is his query about the extent to which we can "deve lop a sociological study of the human/mechanical lan guage community where the 'machines' in question are, say, bicycles, 'Ibid., |».
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' Ibid , p bb'Z. em phasis added missiles, or food processors."48 But I wonder whether his analysis is not a bit tangled or even upside down. (So much for butterflies and bats.) The crucial distinction-people versus machines-may not just be a "strategic practice of members o f the AI community." Carl Mitcham concludes from his survey that today there is a consensus among philosophers that machines cannot think, while com puter scientists do not agree.49 W hether in the guise of the computational metaphor, the com puter as person image50 (with Marvin Minsky even as a society of actors), or of the evolutionary metaphor, the collapsing of the distinction is an achievement of the cybernetic sciences themselves. And notwithstanding his own repeated admonitions to assert sociol ogy's right to deal with machines by not falling into the traps of AI proponents' self-interested metaphysics, Woolgar not only appeals to AI practitioners' suspected nonadherence to the distinction but, in the end, explicitly to theoretical AI discourse itself: "H itherto abstract concerns in the philosophy of the social sciences can now be broached empirically by reference to the recent attempts of A I researchers to probe the limit of the distinction between human behaviour and machine activity. Thus the question o f w hether there are essential differences between humans and machines can be addressed with respect to attem pts to develop a subclass of machines which are, arguably, endowed with a hum an capability, intelligence."31
Randall Collins, of the University of California, anchored in a solid old-European sociological tradition and, all the same, gifted with the talent of synthesizing a proliferation of unorthodox and heterodox developments in sociology, has recently joined the debate. In an essay on the state and vitality of the discipline-"Is 1980s Sociology in a Doldrums?"-he analyzes promising vistas.32 Not that he would count approaches to science and technology am ong them; those are not even mentioned. A part from methodological and theory-strategic issues, he dwells mainly on gender and a new sociology o f emotions. It is in this latter context that his only reference to technology appears.
According to Collins, a future sociology o f emotions will have major consequences for social-science developments. "T he time is ripening for a theoretical upheaval . . . as we have to come to grips with the grounding of language not only in cognitive aspects of social interac tion but in what may tu rn out to be its emotional interactional substrate." And he continues:
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One of the payoffs of this is likely to be a practical contribution to the development of Artificial Intelligence. It is becoming increasingly clear that individualistic psychology has not cracked the code that will open the way to a computer that can think and talk like a human being, and AI leaders are already turning to cognitive sociologists, including ethnomethodological ones, for a better lead. It may be one of the ironies of the 1990s (or possibly another decade thereafter) that one of the most ivory-tower branches of our discipline will turn out to be connected with sociology's most notable practical applications, the achievement of high-level artificial intelligence. ' '
A computer that can think and speak like a hum an being-Collins does not specify the meaning he wishes to give to the term "like." But read in context, he, too, seems to have a homology rather than an analogy in mind. Note also that he adds talking to the capability of thinking.
This invites two observations. First, Collins surpasses the central AI debate, where emotionality is made a nobler attribute of hum ankind than intelligence. T he road to functional AI machines will be opened by simulating emotionality, or at least the linkages between cognition and emotion. Second, the tone is distinctly euphoric: sociology may at last unfold as a really practical science. Responding to criticism from Norman Denzin, Collins reaffirms: "My argum ent [was] that, if AI is ever going to be successful, it will have to be done by sociologists, who incorporate precisely the bodily situated, emotional, situationally negotiated aspects of real hum an intelligence."54
The lieenchantment of the Disenchanted
Sociology has rediscovered freestanding artifacts, mainly (and maybe regrettably so) in the form of computers. All at once, these ''Ibid , p 131*1. ruiph.isis .hided ''k.tlidiill ( dilluift, "Nrplv In I h'H/iu," /omiitil nf Siniatoffl 93 (I9K7): IK I H I, IKI machines are made into something like social actors, and sociology is expected to take them seriously as such. What has happened? Ethnographic research, in combination with a m ore or less radical epistemological relativism (not in Collins's case, though), is impressed with the finding that computers are "constructed" as creatures, as counteractors, as rational and powerful, in any case somehow auton omous, actors. Special significance is attributed to the fact that such notions are seriously entertained, not only in everyday life or public imagery but also in theoretical and applied science and engineering discourse. What is more, images of-say-hum ane machines are painted in generally optimistic colors by their inventors and constructors-not least by the most prom inent among them.
But why should sociologists of technology begin to appropriate such interpretations as theoretical resources? It seems to me that a certain intellectual flutter is building up-at first glance, light and elegant; at second glance, rather batty. T he historical process of disenchantm ent, in Max Weber's u n d er standing of the term, is closely linked to the capability (and admissability) of experimentally decontextualizing material objects and events, according to a program of science oriented since the Renais sance toward technological control. Decoupling natural processes dis ciplined in apparatus ("socially norm ated natural events," as N orbert Elias calls it, talking about time and clocks)56 from those normative and symbolic contexts that orient social interaction is part and parcel of this program and its manifestations. Rather successfully, if not linearly, such operations have been subsumed under their own proper norms and symbols-scientific and technical ones. Relevant normative orientations are, among others, the good to be had from being able to freely repeat, calculate, control, expand, and refine appropriate 222 Bernward Joerges ''McCloskey (n. 6 above), p. 81. Social constructivist science research itself has shown that natural scientists use very different conceptual repertoires, depending on the context. According to Nigel Gilbert's and Michael Mulkay's O/ii'iiinn l 'uiiilnin\ lin\ (London, 1984) , e.g., they tend to activate "realist" codes low,nil sliideuis .uni laypersons (which includes social scientists), as opposed to "In lionalisi" lot tits ol representation among themselves.
" Norbert Elias, Olin tile M l . Aibrilm h i W'lwriiwinluhiglr II 11 I illll-lilt I. I'lH II. p m i operations; and, above all, to achieve thereby a splendid indifference toward activities that cannot be "norm ated," symbolized, and kept under control in this manner. T he power of these orientations is great and not without its own magic. Yet, periodic disillusionments are just as great: irritations and disturbances not only in society's natural metabolism but also in the maintenance of ultimately more powerful orientations. T h at is why attempts at relativizing past decontextualization and disenchantment, at resubjectivation in the sense suggested above with reference to Piaget and Boesch, will always occur and will certainly be more marked in times of desultory technical change.
Sociologists are involved in this process willy-nilly. They always take part in the recontextualization o f the technologies they study. Sociol ogy cannot offer a "meta-discourse" that itself is insulated from technology. This is why distancing and self-critical control of unavoid able and unwitting involvement seemed appropriate for a social science rooted in the Enlightenment and oriented to an ethos of disenchanting that which can be disenchanted. For the same reason, social science rooted in a critique of the Enlightenm ent has called for conscious partisanship and participation in a program of hum an betterment. The new sociologists of technology, it seems, are not much pleased with either strategy. T heir theoretical recourse to everyday images and myths of technology and to engineering-science discourse leaves the status of their argum ents and their theoretical objectives quite uncertain.
Could it be that a Zeitgeist of romancing the machine is getting the better of sociologists who are just beginning to venture into the world o f technical things?
But What to Do with A I Machines?
It is true, there is much more "mind in the machine" than is realized by sociologists evading concern with machinery. But it is the same mind, or spirit, that is in all machines. T he fundam ental question is not 'lu tin g 's "Can machines think?" but rather "Do machines act?" W hether soeiologists of technology can escape the noise around the "thinking machines" and still come up with a reasonable approach to them depends on the way this question is answered. Do machines act? Yes, they do in a specific sense. Does this make them actors-subjects? Nil, indeed not."
Com puters are, like all machines, devices for decontextualization: that is, products of the transmission o f specific patterns and processes of action, including the calculations underlying them, to freestanding artifacts in order to free them from cultural and personal peculiarities and differences. In the case of computers, complex logical operations are transmitted. In the case of so-called work machines, for instance, operations requiring power and manual skills are transmitted. Com puters, however, decontextualize in a more sensitive domain than other machines, and they can quite universally be linked back to hum an actions. They have, to use Elaine Scarry's notion, vastly greater "leverage."58 Yet these assertions, seemingly easy to agree on, w arrant rethinking. What about nuclear plants, space technology, engineered organisms? T he decontextualizing effects of such tech nologies are enormous. If the responses they elicit from sociologists are not similar to those produced by AI machines, it may only be yet another indication that sociological images of technology are bor rowed from the field without sufficiently being examined within some "metalanguage of the social sciences."59
As pointed out, the history of the discipline explains this well. A dematerialized concept of social action in the Weberian tradition, but also the esoterics of action a la Niklas Luhm ann or the lofty sign acrobatics of semiology, has rendered access to real operating m achin ery difficult or impossible. Machinery in these traditions does not represent significant activity and therefore cannot be dealt with significantly. W hat is social about machinery surrounds it; its inner social structure remains covert. While the technical sciences have advanced further and further into the outer material world, the social sciences have moved further and further away from it. T he level of direct practical concourse with things, where doubts regarding their social nature cannot easily arise, has progressively been lost as a level for conceptual reference. Entile Durkheim began his Rules with the requirem ent that sociological analyses be perform ed from things to their images, not from images to things: "Living in the midst of things, men cannot but make them subject to their thoughts, and orient their conduct accordingly. Only because such conceptualiza tions are closer to us . . . than the realities from which they spring we tend . . . to put the form er in the place of the latter and make them the object of our considerations. . . . Instead of a science of realities we only practice ideological analysis."60 Durkheim explicitly includes material-technical systems (e.g., houses, traffic networks) among things (or social facts) because we should consider them to be of a "moral nature, even though they have their basis in physical nature, too."61 In the meantime, sociologists have largely come to prefer going from images of images to images of things. Theoretical focus is on signs to the extent that they signify signs. And then come these deceptively intelligent microelectronic machines, who can themselves m anipulate signs and symbols, think and talk, even develop theories, and they dem and theoretical attention.
Machines will think when people come to believe they think. T here is little chance to settle the problem of whether they actually think (or act) like hum an beings, and should therefore be treated analytically like social actors, empirically, just as the issue of hum ans being merely "a mass of cells and things" is not an empirical matter. MacCormac, in observing that "[mjetaphorical personification, which has probably existed since the advent of hum an speech, has become extensive among com puter scientists and everyday users," also draws attention to the demonic quality of the phenom enon: "Primitive man often personified natural objects by giving them divine status; perhaps we have shifted the deification from nature to technology."62 T he new sociologists o f technology I have cited have not shown that people actually treat computers as actors in the sense o f sustaining some form of social relationship with them. T heir findings rather point to an ongoing process of change in the forms and meanings o f social relationships occasioned by committing hum an activities to m achin ery. In the case of computers, this process may be particularly dramatic or obvious.63 For sociology, it seems to me, the question is whether there are good reasons to justify commitments to technical artifacts as actors conceptually-and thereby to underw rite the definilional powers of technological institutions and protagonists. "'MacKay (n. 50 above), p. 97; MacCormac (n. 8 above), p. 215. Perhaps the priest metaphor lor modern social scientists could in fact be taken more literally again: an upcoming generation, dissatisfied with old European dogmas and refined Thomism, seems to tut ti Io millennistic and syncretistic cargo cults, where technology reappears as 22b lieiiiii'tnil / o/'if't' s I low Io "skill the cat''? Not wishing to resort to pure polemics or to dogma, 1 suggest, regarding the "actorship" of advanced technical artifacts, a kind of "defensive agnosticism" (MacKay). In the m ean time, one could try to move closer, sociologically, to what machines actually do and how this is achieved-epistemically and technically, not metaphorically. So-called thinking machines can be conceived of as one class of machines among many others. One has only to realize, conceptually, that all machines share in and control our actions, not only thinking machines. W ithout belatedly mystifying historically older machines, this strategy saves us from assigning hum an capabil ities to computers any differently than to clocks or sailing ships. Analyzing the concept of the "responsibility of things" in AngloSaxon law and its Roman and Germanic roots, Oliver Wendell Holmes noted that, while anything moving is traditionally held to be particu larly alive, ships are considered "the most living of inanimate things." And he observes, "It is only by supposing the ship to have been treated as if endowed with personality that the arbitrary seeming peculiarities of the maritime law can be made intelligible, and on that supposition, they at once become consistent and logical."64
Conclusion
T he advent of electronic computational machinery has doubtless produced immense cultural perturbations and contributes to a redis covery of a world of enchantm ent where older sociologies saw major sources of rationalization and disenchantm ent. It has also given momentum to a project of "revising sociology's concept of the actor," explicitly or unwittingly put forward in otherwise divergent sociolog ical approaches. Appeals to language conventions and beliefs of those who make and use technical artifacts, conscious attempts not to insulate sociological discourse from public debate, and proposals to use the images of technology "out there" as conceptual resources play im portant roles in this undertaking. One may look forward to the m anner in which this program is carried further and to the way AI machines evolve as either butterflies or bats of a sociology devoted to technology.®
